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Abstract
In the course of everyday running of contemporary 
political and institutional systems, decision makers are 
often faced with a great complexity of big and small 
challenges requiring decisive action in line with laid 
down principles and rules of behaviour. In the process of 
trying to satisfy the various corporate interests within an 
institutional framework, the decision maker is faced with, 
and often has to choose between various competing policy 
options. Making use of library research methodology, 
the paper undertook a careful and critical appraisal of the 
ways and means by which decision makers arrive at basic 
decisions in the dynamic field of international politics, 
with a view to discovering basic consistencies that can 
form a basis for an understanding of the theory of decision 
making, in a descriptive explanatory and predictive 
perspective. The paper concluded that, since the decision 
making environment does not always manifest openness 
and popular participation, the ultimate decision maker’s 
sense of objectivity cannot always be guaranteed. 
Key words: Decision-making; Rational actor; 
Bureaucratic politics; Bounded rationality; Leadership
Afinotan, L. A. (2014). Decision-Making in International Relations: A 
Theoretical Analysis. Canadian Social Science, 10(5), 249-256. Available 
from: http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/css/article/view/4970 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/4970
INTRODUCTION
In the course of everyday running of contemporary 
political and institutional systems, decision makers 
are often faced with a great complexity of big and small 
challenges requiring decisive action in line with laid down 
principles and rules and behaviour. In the process of trying to 
satisfy the various corporate interests within an institutional 
framework, the decision maker is faced with, and often has to 
choose between various competing policy options.
Political decision-making for instance concerns 
authoritative allocation of public values. The essence 
of responsible political leadership is very often the 
need for just, equitable and deliberate or conscious 
allocation of common values that are held in trust for 
the commonwealth, by the leadership. This conscious 
allocation however involves the notion of opportunity 
costs. This implies that the more the government directs 
its resources towards the attainment of particular ends, the 
less it has the ability to deploy the same resources to meet 
other pressing needs.
Decision making is therefore that thinking that results 
in the choice among alternative courses of action. The 
degree of independence a nation state enjoys can in a 
sense be measured in terms of the extent to which its 
choice reflect the uninfluenced decision of its leadership, 
rather than to what extent its actions or choices are 
predetermined by the events in its external environment.
Decisions may be classified in terms of their weight 
or importance. Some decisions are very weighty and 
fundamental while others are merely routine. Such 
fundamental decisions as Selznick (quoted in Adeniran, 
1983) refer to as “Critical decisions” may have far 
reaching consequences for the state as for the international 
arena within which they are taken. Such decisions 
may involve a reformulation of goals, strategies and 
techniques.
Whereas  rou t ine  dec i s ions ,  a s  Se lzn ick  ( in 
Adeniran, 1983) observes, are established cannons 
that provide the premise for everyday decisions and 
actions. Routine decisions may deal with such issues 
as selection of employees, morale building, group 
cohesions and organizations procedures and forms.
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The purpose of this work is to take a careful and critical 
look at the ways and means by which decision makers 
reach their decisions in the dynamic field of international 
politics and perhaps arrive at an appreciation with a view 
to discovering certain consistencies that can form a basis 
for an understanding of the theory of decision making.
The decision making framework involves essentially 
the following five elements:
1) The decision situation, which involves or relates 
to the objective character of the environment which can 
be essential to decision-making. This could be internal 
or external, human or non human, or contending factors 
that may or may not be antagonistic to one another, hence 
the Decision Situation could be one of calm crisis, or 
pressure.
2) Decision Participants, concern the key actors in the 
decision-making process, their backgrounds in education, 
experiences, value systems and value preferences. Here, 
one needs to consider the perception and capabilities of 
the officials involved in the decision making process.
3) The Decision Organisation, revolve around the 
context within which decisions are being taken, in terms 
of the units and sub-units that are involved, and the 
general or specific roles that are assigned to each.
4) The Decision Process which touches upon the 
various techniques and strategies used to arrive at the 
decision. This relates to the competence of decision 
participants, the information available to them as well as 
what their motives or motivation might be
5) The Decision Outcome. This concerns the net 
results or totality of the output of the decision making 
process, and involves all the effects and consequences of 
this process.
Decision making therefore deals with the trends 
which lead to or build up into choices and consensus. 
It analyses the relationships among policy makers, 
between them and the public, between officials and the 
press and between goals and issues. Thus according to 
Rosenau (1966), Decision making sustains bureaucracies, 
dominates legislatures, pre-occupies chief executives and 
characterizes judicial bodies. Decisions lead to policy, 
produce conflict and foster cooperation.
1.  ECOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK--THE 
STATE AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
AS LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
The ecology of a decision making process that can form a 
basis for an enduring decision making theory must display 
certain basic prerequisites, which can manifest only 
under very well defined conditions. A viable ecological 
framework for analyzing any theory of decision making 
therefore must of necessity encompass those basic 
conditions within which the decision maker can fit into his 
role as required by the challenges of his necessary activity.
Thus, the nation state, and the international system 
of states readily presents themselves as necessary and 
inescapable fields of activity for the decision maker, 
and therefore a natural framework for the analysis and 
understanding of the theory of decision making. But what 
manner of state, and what manner of international system, 
becomes the poser that arises before one. In a fascist 
or dictatorial state the state is in the grip of a political 
“strongman” who is capable of arbitrary subjective and 
ill-motivated decisions, and who can afford to, as it 
were “damn the consequences” for so long as his private 
objective is attained.
Nigeria under Abacha, Uganda under Idi Amin and 
Central African Republic under Bedel Bokassa are 
examples of such states, still so numerous in parts of 
the third world. Such states as these do not manifest 
such basic pre-requisites for the building of a sound 
theory of decision making, as the conditions necessary 
for this, involving as it should, a high level of neutrality 
and objectivity in information gathering, analysis and 
processing for sound decision making is lacking. 
Consequently, a modern democratic state with its 
many sided controls based upon the rule of law and 
accountability to the populace may form the best ecological 
framework within which a decision making theory may 
be situated. Also, those actors who make decisions in 
any state are simply a reflection of the socio-economic, 
political and ideological conditions prevalent within the 
state. For instance, in a capitalist state like the U.S.A., the 
decision making actors are drawn mainly from the big 
multinational corporations. Their perception of the world 
leads to policies designed to reinforce corporate capitalism 
through the pursuit of profit at home and abroad.
C o n v e r s e l y  a l s o ,  w h e n  a  t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y 
underdeveloped nation chooses the path of Western style 
democracy and capitalist oriented free market economy, 
her leaders already in the compradorial network of global 
capitalism, are soon socialized and oriented to subject 
the nation to neo-colonial control through the policies 
that they pursue. Thus, according to Adeniran (1983), 
the nation state level of analysis concentrates upon such 
factors as the political system of the state, its economy, 
social structures and other internal characteristics. All 
these will determine the behaviour of a state in the process 
of decision making.
But according to Holsti (1983) when we say “states” 
behave, we really mean that policy makers are defining 
purposes, choosing among courses of action and utilizing 
national capabilities to achieve objectives in the name 
of the state”. In Holsti’s view, the State as a level of 
analysis, “focuses on the ideologies, motivations, ideals, 
perceptions, values, or idiosyncrasies of those who are 
empowered to make decisions for the State” (Holsti, 1983).
The International system of states is a system of inter 
connection between states as actors in the international 
decision making process. This refers to the component 
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units of all the sovereign states that make up the world 
system, their behaviours regulated by national interest and 
international law, in a never ending game of strategy.
The focus on the international system as a level of 
analysis places emphasis on the external environment as 
the determinant of foreign policy decision making. This 
view assumes that all states display similar characteristics 
with regards to the interests they pursue. In this regard, 
states are interdependent.
According to Tunde Adeniran, 
One common example that is often used to illustrate the 
usefulness of this level of analysis is the balance of power 
theory. It is usually applied in such a way as to explain the 
shifts and consistencies in the behaviour of states over a 
period of time. States according to this theory, forms coalitions 
and counter-coalitions in order to prevent the dominance of 
hegemony of an ambitious state. Presumably a balancer also 
exists to intervene on behalf of the weaker side in order to 
prevent an imbalance in the power relations. The way this type 
of equilibrium is maintained and the patterns of balance and 
imbalance are said to reflect the behaviour of states as units in 
the system. (Adeniran, 1983)
The international system of states provides a 
good environment within which a theory of decision 
making may be observed, analysed and understood. 
Although the dependency status of many states who, 
though politically independent, are in a neo-colonial 
relationship with their erstwhile colonial masters may 
intervene. This fact somewhat limits the usefulness of 
this level of analysis.
It is pertinent to mention here that these two levels are 
not by any means exhaustive of possible levels of analysis 
of the theories of decision making. There are other units 
such as the individual personal actor, and other sub-units 
like political parties, organizations, classes and ethnic 
groups as well as ideological blocks, regional and multi-
national corporations inter alia.
2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANALYSIS
2.1  The Game Theory
As a framework for analysis of the games theory is 
perhaps the best approach to decision making analysis in 
the two principal levels of analysis outlined above.
The theory of the game is a mathematical analysis 
of any situation involving a conflict of interest with the 
intent of indicating the optimal choices that, under given 
conditions will lead to a desired outcome (Dauben & 
Warren, 1993).
Developed by John Von Neuman inter alios, the 
game theory is a technique of making rational choices 
among several alternative courses of action, with a 
view to maximizing gains and minimizing losses. It 
assures that all players are rational and will make such 
choices amongst available alternatives that will enhance 
a favourable outcome or pay-off and minimize losses. 
Since all players at the game are similarly motivated, the 
level and volume of information available to each player 
relative to the other become decisive.
Although John Neuman originally considered and 
assumed a situation of perfect information, this is not 
possible in the real life scenario making instability an 
inevitable albeit temporary accompaniment of the game in 
real life situations.
2.2  Basic Concepts
Basically the team game refers to a rather definite conflict 
scenario in which ‘N’ of individuals known as players 
participate, with a known list of rules stipulating the 
conditions under which the game commences. 
Also stipulated are possible legal “moves” at each 
stage of play, the total number of moves that constitutes 
the entirety of the game, as well as the terms of the 
outcome at the end of play. The basic concepts in Games 
theory include such terms as “move”, “pay off”, Extensive 
and Normal form, perfect information and strategy.
2.2.1  Move
This refers to the actual process of play, and the manner 
in which the game or play progresses from one stage 
to another, and through to the final move. Moves may 
alternate between players in a predetermined fashion or 
may occur simultaneously. Moves maybe made either 
by personal choice or by chance, in which case all 
probabilities are calculable.
2.2.2  Payoff or Outcome
This is a game theory term describing what happens 
at the end of a game. This refers to a situation where a 
winner has emerged and the prize at stake is declared or 
recognized as going to the winner, as was anticipated at 
the beginning of the move. The payoff is the reward for 
victory or participation at the game.
2.2.3  Extensive and Normal Form
One of the most important distinct wins made in 
characterizing different forms of games is, that between 
extensive and normal. A game is aid to be in extensive 
form if it is characterized by a set of rules that determines 
the possible moves at each step, indicating which player is 
to move. The probabilities at each point if a move is to be 
made by a chance determination, and the set of outcome, 
assigning a particular payoff or result to each possible 
conclusion of the game. The assumption is also made 
that such player have a set of preferences at each move 
in anticipation of possible outcomes that will minimize 
losses. And a game is said to be in normal form if the list of 
all expected outcomes or payoffs to each player for every 
possible combination of strategies is given for any sequence 
of choices in the game (Dauben & Warren, 1993).
2.2.4  Perfect Information
A game is said to have perfect information if all the 
moves and strategies are already known to all the players 
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involved. This is hardly possible in real life situations 
where the game is international politics and the pawns are 
human beings.
2.2.5  Strategy
A strategy in the theory of games is “a list of optimal 
choices for each player at every stage of a given game. A 
strategy taking into account all possible moves is a plan 
that cannot be upset regardless of what may occur in the 
game (Dauben & Warren, 1993).
2.3  Kinds of Games
In the theory of games, there are various classifications 
depending on the number of players and the circumstances 
of play in the game itself. Thus there is the Solitaire or 
one person’s game, the two person’s games, and the zero-
sum games.
2.3.1  One Person Games
An one-person game is a game where there is no conflict 
of interest. It is played by one player alone, and there is 
no adversary to offer counter strategic choices with which 
the single player can contend. This is hardly relevant to 
any situation other than a one man dictatorship in political 
theory.
2.3.2  Two-Person Games
The two-persons games have been the subject of intensive 
analysis in game theory. The problem arises when there is 
an attempt to extend the results of a two person theory to 
N-person games, with a view to predicting the possibilities 
and probabilities of inter-action among various players.
In most two-party games the choices and expected pay 
offs at the end of the game are generally well known, but 
when three or more players are involved, many interesting 
but complicating opportunities arise for coalition, 
cooperation and collusion (Dauben & Warren; 1993).
2.3.3  Zero-Sum games
A game is said to be zero-sum when in payoff, the total 
amount gained is exactly equal to the total amount lost. 
Thus a zero-sum game is one where the total amount of 
pay offs at the end of the game is zero as what is won 
cancels out what is lost. The condition here however is 
that, between the two players, what is lost by one is won 
by the other.
Thus in the practice of international politics the zero 
sum game scenario is hardly possible, or very rare. For 
instance the war over Kuwait fought against Iraq by 
America and its allies were won by America. Kuwait 
was seized back from Iraq, but remained an independent 
state, and did not become owned by America. Thus Iraq’s 
loss did not translate to America’s gain in a zero-sum 
perspective. Instead, the scenario most common to the 
international system is the N-person non zero-sum option. 
Under this option, a player may gain more at the expense of 
the other who gains less, but it is almost never zero-sum.
3.  THE THEORY OF DECISION MAKING
The main emphasis international relations have undergone 
a shift from the institutional and specific event analysis 
that is both time and place specific to a more generalized 
and theoretical format. This new area of emphasis could 
be of fundamental importance in the formulation of 
predictive theories of Politics and International relations, 
but even more significantly for creating organizing 
devises or approaches that helps to operationalize in an 
orderly manner, the great diversity of events and facts in 
international politics.
This has resulted in a new trend in the discipline which 
compels students and investigators not only to learn in a 
historical and descriptive perspective, basic international 
events, but also to become concerned with selecting data 
relevant to a given problematic, ordering and relating 
the gathered data to each other with a view to arriving at 
preliminary generalizations which can form the basis for 
the development of a theory. 
One of such theories in international politics is the 
theory of decision making. Researches and studies based 
on the decision making theory seek to discover:
1)  Who within the state makes political decisions, and 
whether such decisions are rational or irrational.
2)  What are the parameters for determining rationality 
in political decision making?
3)  What are the impact of such decisions on the 
political system?
In Politics and International relations today, three main 
theories of decision making are current. They are:
1)  The Rational actor theory,
2)  The bounded rationality theory,
3)  The Bureaucratic politics theory.
3.1  The Rational Actor Theory
The rational actor theory of decision making, also known 
as the maximizing of expected utility theory, assumes that:
1)  There is a single homogenous good or utility which 
is present in all actually desired ends, and an increased 
amount of any end brings with it an increased amount of 
utility, at a steadily diminishing rate (Snyder & Diesing, 
1977). In this case the end or good is subject to the theory 
of diminishing marginal utility.
2)  The decision maker is faced with a set of well 
defined and mutually exclusive alternatives from which 
he can choose.
3)  That being a rational educated and skilled actor, 
the decision maker is able to estimate the outcome and 
calculate the expected value or benefit of each outcome.
Given these assumptions, the decision maker calculates 
the expected value of each alternative, compares all 
alternatives, and chooses the alternative that maximizes 
expected utility, or in the game perspective chooses the 
strategy that maximizes utility and minimizes regret. 
It is assumed that the decision maker can compare two 
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packages containing varying combinations of goods and 
know that he prefers one or is indifferent between them.
For example, if we suppose that there are two desired 
goods in one package such as pounded yam and egusi 
soup, with N100 to be spent on them. It means we can have 
100 alternative combinations of pounded yam and egusi 
soup ranging from N1 worth of pounded yam and N99 
worth of egusi soup to N99 worth of pounded yam and N1 
worth of egusi soup. In other words, the decision maker 
can have more of one and less of the other over a range of 
100 combination packages, and know which combination 
he prefers to the other. But in order to be in a position to 
compare goods in this manner, the goods themselves must 
display a high degree of homogeneity, as for instance egusi 
soup and pounded yam are both foods. It would be more 
difficult for instance to compare such packages if one was 
food and the other personal safety and security. Thus in 
practice homogeneity of goals is also assumed, perhaps 
even more than the concept of a single ultimate utility.
Also, in order to be able to calculate an infinite number 
of alternatives and the expected value of the outcome of 
each one, an infinite calculating ability and omniscience is 
assumed, as an underlying principle.
However, it has been argued elsewhere that 
The assumption of omniscience is not necessary to a 
maximization model as Cross among others has shown. Without 
this assumption, the maximiser has a set of comparable goals, 
some but not all possible alternatives, and some information 
about the expected effect of the alternatives on the goals. He 
then calculates the expected value of each alternative and 
chooses the one with the highest expected value. But in Cross’s 
version, this simplification introduces a new complication: as 
each new price of information comes in, the bargainer must 
recalculate all his equations, his cost and return curves and 
continue or change his current strategy accordingly. He can 
also calculate the cost of new information, compare it with 
the expected returns, and estimate how much time or effort he 
must expend in getting new information (Cross, in Snyder and 
Diesing, 1977) (emphasis mine). 
Cross’ version of the maximizing model thus depends 
even more on the assumption of remarkable calculating 
ability since the calculations are done not once, but 
continually. (Snyder & Diesing, 1977) 
Another version of the rational actor theory, not 
only drops the assumptions of omniscience on the part 
of the decision maker but also drops the assumption 
of extra-ordinary calculating ability. Under this 
model, the decision maker has several crudely defined 
alternatives which value and consequences he merely 
makes intelligent guesses about. He then compares the 
expected consequences, two at a time and by a process of 
elimination finally determines the best alternative. This 
version of the theory retains only the comparability of 
goals and its homogeneity in terms of the ultimate good.
Other given or basic assumptions of the rational actor 
theory of decision making has to do with its ecology or 
the environment within which it can become optimally 
operational.
1)  That the decision maker has access to limitless 
information concerning all the options connected with the 
alternatives under his consideration.
2)  That the maximiser is an institutionally designated 
actor empowered to act in a democratic or popular 
participatory political context, which is inherently stable.
3)  That the decision maker is able to rise above 
personal prejudices and biases in order to be unyieldingly 
objective and rational. 
It is however just in these assumptions that the 
limitations of this paradigm lie. First being overly 
dependent upon information, it becomes vulnerable 
if incorrect information is given or if the information 
available is not comprehensive enough to permit of a 
sound decision.
Secondly, the reality of international relations hardly 
gives time for a long process of information gathering 
and analysis as is necessary to arrive at the best available 
alternatives, especially in crisis situations. Besides, being 
human, one cannot rule out the psychological element in 
the analysis of the decision maker, whose decision may 
not always be completely devoid of subjectivity.
Furthermore as has been stated earlier under 
ecological framework, the decision making environment 
must manifest openness and popular participation. 
This not being always the case, the decision maker’s 
sense of objectivity and responsibility cannot always be 
guaranteed.
3.2  The Bounded Rationality Theory
The bounded rationality theory may be seen as a 
complement to the rational actor model. Dropping some 
of the assumptions of the latter such as homogeneity of 
goods and outstanding calculating ability, it comes closer 
to empirical practice without necessarily losing theoretical 
simplicity. The bounded rationality theory assumes 
inter alia, but most fundamentally, the heterogeneity of 
goods, as against the homogeneity of the rational actor. 
It acknowledges the great difficulty associated with 
making comparison between incomparable ends which 
are mutually exclusive, or nearly so, such that achieving 
one may undermine if not completely sacrifice the other. 
As for example, the concepts of; Freedom and National 
Security. One cannot tell how much of freedom to 
sacrifice in order to get sufficient value of national order 
and security, or how much of the latter to sacrifice to get 
enough of freedom.
Secondly, there is an assumption of greater dynamism 
and mobility in the availability of alternatives and 
information concerning available options. Thus not 
all alternatives are known or available at the start of a 
decision making process. Thirdly, even for the known 
options, one is not able to calculate the probability or 
otherwise of their capacity to attain specific goods in 
mathematically exact terms. This calculation can be done 
only crudely.
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However, the main distinguishing feature of this 
model from the earlier one, is the fact of heterogeneity 
of goods. This eliminates completely the idea of the 
“best possible alternative”, which in this context has no 
operational meaning, as there is no way of “maximizing” 
choices. Since each good is qualitatively unique, one 
cannot compensate for the sacrifice of one by the extra 
achievement of the other. Consequently, all goods must 
be achieved and an alternative is unacceptable unless it 
is able to achieve all goods. Put differently, each goods 
achieved, becomes a constraint to the achievement of an 
acceptable alternative.
According to this theory constraints can be positive 
or negative. It is positive when it concerns the use of 
some positive action to achieve a good. In which case, the 
constraint is called a “goal”. But when a good is already 
in existence having been previously attained, action to 
prevent it from being damaged or to avoid a potentially 
damaging effect is called a negative constraint.
Very often a desire to achieve a good may mean being 
exposed to the risk of endangering an already existing 
value. “A simple decision/problem under this paradigm is 
one in which there is a single goal to be achieved and two 
or more evils to be avoided, and in which an acceptable 
alternative is one that achieves the goal and avoids the 
evils. In another kind of problem, one must prevent one 
evil while avoiding still others (Snyder & Diesing, 1977).
However, “achieving a goal” is not an absolute 
concept, since goals are achievable in stages and to vary 
degrees. The criterion which specifies what degree of 
achievement is acceptable to the decision maker is what 
is known as the level of aspiration. For example, if the 
United States of America could not “take out” Saddam 
Hussein and install a new government in Baghdad as was 
the main objective, it could at least contain and neutralize 
Iraq under Saddam as an effective military threat in the 
Gulf region. The latter being a reduced but acceptable 
(even if temporarily) level of aspiration vis-à-vis the initial 
goal. America had to be satisfied with this reduced level 
of aspiration for now in order to avoid the greater evil 
of losing the support of its allies in the event of its going 
ahead to overrun Baghdad and arrest Saddam in person. 
Besides it needed to avoid the risk of a more determined 
opposition from the Soviet Union and China, in addition 
to international condemnation, instead of applause.
The level of aspiration could be reviewed upwards 
on downwards in the course of development of events, 
and is by no means static. But since the term “level 
of aspiration” cannot be used in reference to negative 
constraints, which concerns protection of something 
already achieved, the term level of acceptability is used to 
describe the protection of existing values or avoidance of 
evil effects or better put, “negative constraints”.
From the theoretical viewpoint the level of aspiration and 
level of acceptability represents the maximum and minimum 
levels respectively to changes in aspirational level. Initial 
aspiration level may be set at maximum level at the onset of 
bargaining, although the decision maker normally does not 
expect to achieve his full initial bid, and would be satisfied 
with a bit less. As the bargaining progresses, there maybe 
successive lowering of levels but usually never as low as the 
minimum, but this varies according to the nature of available 
alternatives. But in none of these procedures for raising or 
lowering levels of aspiration or acceptability is complex 
calculating ability required.
Bounded rationality and maximizing theories are 
not as incompatible as they may appear to be. They can 
indeed be combined with one as a supplement to the 
other. The bounded rationality can provide solutions 
where the shortcomings of the maximizing theory 
become an obstacle. As for instance, in the process 
of searching for the best alternative, it is impossible 
to consider all alternatives. Thus the decision maker 
may use constraints and levels of acceptability to 
eliminate and narrow down the alternatives to a few 
obvious reasonable and promising choices. Nor can 
one consider all possible consequences. When a 
particular bad consequence appears, one can eliminate 
the alternative or modify it to reduce the likelihood 
of that consequence recurring by using the levels of 
acceptability to screen alternatives.
Thus whereas maximization equation represents 
the ideal limits that a good decision approach, through 
its potential for greater exactitude, the bounded 
Rationality procedures are however more descriptive 
of actual decisions. Conversely, the maximizing 
theory, by focusing on the ideal limits ignores the 
actual difficulties of comparing goods, (especially such 
goods as are not comparable). The bounded rationality 
theory by providing a practical way to deal with the 
problem, however loses sight of the ideal goal of the 
entire process. Both of these models are necessary and 
complimentary. 
Finally, in order to properly position the bounded 
rationally theory in its true perspective, the view of Snyder 
and Diesing (1977) quoted below is most germane. 
One can approach this combination by considering why crises 
occur at all. They occur because the normal conflict of interest 
between great powers has become so intense as to produce an 
intolerable situation for at least one power. And because the 
attempt of that power to correct the intolerable situation makes 
things intolerable for one or more other powers. This specific 
situation is what the crisis is about, and the essential objective 
for the powers involved is to correct it, to make it tolerable. 
The objective is not the vague abstract one of 
maximizing utility. It is quite specific one of correcting 
the intolerable situation. If there are several ways of doing 
this, some may be better than others, and one certainly 
prefers the better to the worse. More often, the problem 
is to find even one way, that is, finding one acceptable 
solution is a necessity, but finding the best possible 
solution is a luxury.
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The bounded rationality theory focuses directly on 
this central point. Crises decision making is a search for 
a strategy that will correct the intolerable situation, that 
is, a strategy that will preserve or achieve all endangered 
goods at an acceptable level. It is a search for an 
acceptable strategy. When a decision maker cannot find 
or construct even one acceptable strategy, he does not 
choose the best of the unacceptable strategies, that is, he 
does not maximize, and he stalls if possible postponing 
action and search for a way out of the intolerable situation 
(Snyder & Diesing, 1977). Whenever the need arises to 
find an immediate solution to a crisis situation and where 
there are no acceptable choices, there is little opportunity 
to maximize. The bounded rationality model of decision 
making theory becomes imperative.
3.3  The Bureaucratic Politics Theory
Unlike the preceding two theories of decision making 
which are essentially problems solving the decision 
maker as a unitary actor, the bureaucratic politics 
theory drops the unitary actor paradigm and looks at 
the political processes occurring inside the decision-
making unit.
Here the decision maker is the institutions of 
government, being composed of a set of bureaus with 
different resources and responsibilities, quite different 
information sources and also differing largely in the 
influence they each wield over the central decision 
maker.  With in  each depar tment  informat ion  i s 
sourced and operationalized, conclusions reached and 
recommendations made in the process of development 
of policy decisions that are meant to contribute to the 
national interest. The various ministries/departments 
compete amongst themselves for opportunity to influence 
decisions using its political authority, contacts and 
expertise to develop and implement strategies.
Decision making in this theory is a process of getting 
one’s government officially and actually committed to 
some bargaining strategy or tactic, and this involves 
getting the approval of those officials whose approval is 
needed officially and actually. In game terms, decision 
making here is a process of building a majority coalition. 
The strategy is the coalition agreement (Snyder & 
Diesing, 1977).
The strategy for building coalitions may include 
persuasion, bargaining, lobbying key officials and 
departments in a piecemeal fashion. It may also 
include trade-offs between departments that are natural 
opponents. Sometimes, two or more coalitions may form 
to oppose one or more coalitions, especially among those 
departments that are natural allies or that have a common 
interest in a given proposal. These may coalesce to form a 
majority coalition at the expense of another.
The term majority coalition does not here refer to a 
preponderance of numbers, but has more to do with clout – 
the resources at the disposal of the coalescing departments, 
their strategic importance in terms of power and prestige 
in government. Such departments as; the army, the finance 
ministry, and fundamentally also, the ministry that will 
become responsible for the implementation of the decision 
when it finally sails through.
This system of alliances and coalition in the struggle 
for influence in the decision making process seems to 
have a strong parallel with the theory of balance of power 
in a multi- polar, and bi-polar world that is ideologically 
polarized. Here the process is the same as when 
independent states form coalitions to resist a dominant 
power or to enforce a principle or a decision upon another 
independent state, as the U.S. was able to do in the case of 
Iraq during the Gulf war.
In the process of building a coalition with effectively 
pressurizing the central decision maker, the imperatives 
of lobbying bargaining and trade offs may also cause 
the original strategy to undergo modifications to satisfy 
coalition partners. Sometimes, admitting new strategic 
coalition partners may alienate old ones. The sponsors 
of the strategy must therefore weigh carefully the cost-
benefit analysis of admitting new partners at the risk 
of losing old ones. Or even at the cost of changing the 
strategy or amending it.
The bureaucratic politics theory has two components; 
a non rational and a rational. The non rational is basically 
psychological and being related to the individual’s 
values, beliefs, and cognitive sensibilities which are 
mainly determined by his portion in government. For 
instance, the finance minister may be sensitive to politics 
that proposes heavy extra-budgetary expenditure, and 
may thus oppose the move. Therefore partisanship rather 
than objectivity is a likely feature of the inputs into the 
decision making process.
The general picture this theory presents of the 
decision making process is therefore a picture of partisan 
maneuvering into alliances and opposition, each trying 
to capture the commitment of the central decision maker, 
who however avoids committing himself. He mediates 
between the partisans suggesting compromises and trying 
to work out a combination proposal that will satisfy most 
of the partisans. If he succeeds or one of his allies’ aides or 
assistants succeed, then the decision is made.
CONCLUSION
In concluding this work, reference has to be made also to 
the cybernetic theory of decision making, which sees the 
demands of the system through information gathered from 
the system as inputs into the decision making process. 
The policy decisions that emerge from the system are 
the output which is delivered into the society. The output 
further elicits reactions which are returned to the system 
as feedback. The feedback forms a new input for further 
analysis to produce a fresh output. Basically however, 
the three theories of decision making discussed in this 
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work, and which forms the basic cornerstones of decision 
making theory are complementary.
The bureaucratic politics theory supplements 
rather than competes with the rational actor and the 
bounded rationality theories. It focuses more on the 
institutional framework for decision making and 
the internal political imperatives of maintaining and 
increasing influence and power, rather than on the 
problem of choosing a strategy to deal with external 
opportunity or threat. The bureaucratic model may be 
seen as the basic machinery through which the first 
two theories operate within the state. Therefore one 
can conclude that the same decision making behaviour 
can be described as a process of forming and changing 
coalitions, or as a process of testing alternatives 
agains t  const ra in ts ,  lower ing aspi ra t ion levels 
estimating costs, and raising levels of acceptance.
Therefore, all that remains is an effort to juxtapose 
one theory on the other, that is, to show how a process in 
one theory can be described in quite a different process 
in the other theory. This attempt should be seen as 
mandatory because a viable decision making theory must 
encompass all three models. A detailed amalgamation of 
this sort has already been attempted by Gore in his work; 
Administrative decision making (1964).
Finally, it would be relevant to point out here a 
further relationship between these three theories in their 
complementary usefulness. When one or two people 
make decisions, the problem solving theories apply, but 
when three or more people, or a committee or cabinet 
are involved, and a potential coalition situation arises, 
bureaucratic politics theory is more relevant.
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